by Kyle Swan
There are still many people, mostly outside the academy, who think that moral and political obligations are tied to divine commands. People should (not) do certain things because God says so. This would mean that God has practical authority over people. He makes it the case that people have obligations by simply issuing a command. Or, what I think would be roughly the same thing, God can create reasons for people to act, reasons they didn’t have before, by simply issuing a command.
There are still many people, mostly outside the academy, who think that moral and political obligations are tied to divine commands. People should (not) do certain things because God says so. This would mean that God has practical authority over people. He makes it the case that people have obligations by simply issuing a command. Or, what I think would be roughly the same thing, God can create reasons for people to act, reasons they didn’t have before, by simply issuing a command.
For example, the ancient tribes of Israel presumably didn’t
have normative reason to avoid eating bbq baby back ribs before God said not to
eat them. But, according to this account of divine authority, they acquired
such a reason when God declared pork unclean. Moral philosophers often talk
about this kind of reason being external
because the source of the reason is external to the agent who the claim is
directed at, or because the claim is grounded in such a way that the motivational
states of mind of that agent are irrelevant. Perhaps many of the ancient
Israelites really liked bbq baby back ribs. Too bad.
Here’s another example: if you take a class from me you have
to write an assigned paper. Say I assign a paper on Hobbes. You thereby acquire
a reason to write a paper on Hobbes. If I instead assign a paper on Rawls, you
acquire a reason to write a paper on Rawls. I have practical authority (within
this relatively limited domain) over you. Much like God (!) I create a reason for
you to act a certain way, a reason you didn’t have before, by simply requiring
the assignment. You don’t want to write a paper on Hobbes? Too bad.
Maybe there’s a difference here between God and I. The
practical authority I have over my students is contingent on their having signed up for the class. They have
voluntarily placed themselves under my (relatively limited) authority. If I
assigned a paper on Hobbes to my mail carrier, she wouldn’t thereby acquire any
reason at all to write it. But those who review my syllabus, see that there
will be paper assignments, and sign up for the class agree to submit to my
determinations about the content of those assignments. They presumably do this
because taking the class somehow connects up with goals they have or things
they care about. So they have internal
reason to do it. That seems like an important difference.
I’m not sure these cases really are conceptually different,
though. Perhaps God’s authority is similarly contingent, and people’s reasons
to comply with his rules similarly grounded in their motivational states.
Here’s a section of the narrative where God hands down his law to the ancient
Israelites:
Exodus 19:3 Then Moses went up to God, and the LORD called
to him from the mountain and said, “This is what you are to say to the
descendants of Jacob and what you are to tell the people of Israel: 4 ‘You
yourselves have seen what I did to Egypt, and how I carried you on eagles’
wings and brought you to myself. 5 Now if you obey me fully and keep my covenant,
then out of all nations you will be my treasured possession. Although the whole
earth is mine, 6 you will be for me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.’
These are the words you are to speak to the Israelites.” 7 So Moses went back and summoned the elders of the people and set before
them all the words the LORD had commanded him to speak. 8 The people all
responded together, “We will do everything the LORD has said.” So Moses brought
their answer back to the LORD.
This looks a lot like a summary of a contract (or covenant).
There’s a brief preamble and then promises are made on both sides. The terms are
reviewed and accepted and at least appear to be contingent on that acceptance. So
suppose the people of Israel in verse 8 had instead said something like ‘Ummm…
Thanks for all that, and we really appreciate your offer, but no thanks”? Plausibly,
in that case they wouldn’t have had normative reason to comply with all of
God’s rules and God wouldn’t have had the standing to demand compliance or to
punish them for not complying. The same plausibly goes for surrounding nations
that weren’t party to this covenant. The Edomites could eat all the bbq baby
back ribs they wanted. It would have been puzzling for the Israelites to demand
of the Edomites that they not eat bbq baby back ribs and to hold them
accountable if they did. Just as puzzling, perhaps, as me demanding of my mail
carrier that she write a paper about Hobbes and holding her accountable when
she doesn’t.
I’m not a theologian (though sometimes I try to fake it) and
I don’t have too much more to say about the ancient Israelites. But I think the
narrative illustrates important things about the social contract tradition, current
debates about the nature of practical reason and, perhaps most of all, just how
difficult it can be for someone to come to have practical authority over
another person.
Kyle Swan
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Sacramento State
