by Kyle Swan
There are still many people, mostly outside the academy, who think that moral and political obligations are tied to divine commands. People should (not) do certain things because God says so. This would mean that God has practical authority over people. He makes it the case that people have obligations by simply issuing a command. Or, what I think would be roughly the same thing, God can create reasons for people to act, reasons they didn’t have before, by simply issuing a command.
There are still many people, mostly outside the academy, who think that moral and political obligations are tied to divine commands. People should (not) do certain things because God says so. This would mean that God has practical authority over people. He makes it the case that people have obligations by simply issuing a command. Or, what I think would be roughly the same thing, God can create reasons for people to act, reasons they didn’t have before, by simply issuing a command.
For example, the ancient tribes of Israel presumably didn’t
have normative reason to avoid eating bbq baby back ribs before God said not to
eat them. But, according to this account of divine authority, they acquired
such a reason when God declared pork unclean. Moral philosophers often talk
about this kind of reason being external
because the source of the reason is external to the agent who the claim is
directed at, or because the claim is grounded in such a way that the motivational
states of mind of that agent are irrelevant. Perhaps many of the ancient
Israelites really liked bbq baby back ribs. Too bad.
Here’s another example: if you take a class from me you have
to write an assigned paper. Say I assign a paper on Hobbes. You thereby acquire
a reason to write a paper on Hobbes. If I instead assign a paper on Rawls, you
acquire a reason to write a paper on Rawls. I have practical authority (within
this relatively limited domain) over you. Much like God (!) I create a reason for
you to act a certain way, a reason you didn’t have before, by simply requiring
the assignment. You don’t want to write a paper on Hobbes? Too bad.
Maybe there’s a difference here between God and I. The
practical authority I have over my students is contingent on their having signed up for the class. They have
voluntarily placed themselves under my (relatively limited) authority. If I
assigned a paper on Hobbes to my mail carrier, she wouldn’t thereby acquire any
reason at all to write it. But those who review my syllabus, see that there
will be paper assignments, and sign up for the class agree to submit to my
determinations about the content of those assignments. They presumably do this
because taking the class somehow connects up with goals they have or things
they care about. So they have internal
reason to do it. That seems like an important difference.
I’m not sure these cases really are conceptually different,
though. Perhaps God’s authority is similarly contingent, and people’s reasons
to comply with his rules similarly grounded in their motivational states.
Here’s a section of the narrative where God hands down his law to the ancient
Israelites:
Exodus 19:3 Then Moses went up to God, and the LORD called
to him from the mountain and said, “This is what you are to say to the
descendants of Jacob and what you are to tell the people of Israel: 4 ‘You
yourselves have seen what I did to Egypt, and how I carried you on eagles’
wings and brought you to myself. 5 Now if you obey me fully and keep my covenant,
then out of all nations you will be my treasured possession. Although the whole
earth is mine, 6 you will be for me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation.’
These are the words you are to speak to the Israelites.” 7 So Moses went back and summoned the elders of the people and set before
them all the words the LORD had commanded him to speak. 8 The people all
responded together, “We will do everything the LORD has said.” So Moses brought
their answer back to the LORD.
This looks a lot like a summary of a contract (or covenant).
There’s a brief preamble and then promises are made on both sides. The terms are
reviewed and accepted and at least appear to be contingent on that acceptance. So
suppose the people of Israel in verse 8 had instead said something like ‘Ummm…
Thanks for all that, and we really appreciate your offer, but no thanks”? Plausibly,
in that case they wouldn’t have had normative reason to comply with all of
God’s rules and God wouldn’t have had the standing to demand compliance or to
punish them for not complying. The same plausibly goes for surrounding nations
that weren’t party to this covenant. The Edomites could eat all the bbq baby
back ribs they wanted. It would have been puzzling for the Israelites to demand
of the Edomites that they not eat bbq baby back ribs and to hold them
accountable if they did. Just as puzzling, perhaps, as me demanding of my mail
carrier that she write a paper about Hobbes and holding her accountable when
she doesn’t.
I’m not a theologian (though sometimes I try to fake it) and
I don’t have too much more to say about the ancient Israelites. But I think the
narrative illustrates important things about the social contract tradition, current
debates about the nature of practical reason and, perhaps most of all, just how
difficult it can be for someone to come to have practical authority over
another person.
Kyle Swan
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Sacramento State
Thanks for this post, Kyle.
ReplyDeleteI wonder if the nature of the agent provides a significant difference here. In a typical contract, one seems to have reason(s) to engage in the contract depending upon the nature of the agent they are engaging in it with. For a professor, you want to complete the course and get credit. This gives you a normative reason for following the instructions and writing a paper on Hobbes.
The ancient Israelites aren't engaging in a contract with any ol' agent, but with God. If we stipulate that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent, then it seems that there are independent normative reasons for following this contract. After all, a God with that nature wouldn't just ask us to do any old thing, but would presumably have our best interest(s) in mind. So, even if I'm not an ancient Israelite - given that I believe that this is an authentic order given by a God that exists - I have independent normative reasons for following the instructions provided by the contract. If God is the omni-God described above, it seems to be a reasonable inference that the instructions provided by such a being would be in my best interest.
Thanks, Matt, for your comment. There are, I agree, divine command theories where God's commands might just be reliable directional markers to what you have normative reason to do independently of God's commands. But I was thinking about accounts where God has practical authority in the sense described above. For example, if there is reason to avoid bbq baby back ribs, it seems to be just because eating them happens to be one of the things God prohibited. So I was wondering what could make it true that God has practical authority and suggested that the narrative from Exodus gives a somewhat surprising answer.
ReplyDeleteKyle, don't parents have the same kind of practical authority over their young children absent any such covenant?
ReplyDeleteI think so. Parents may even have *natural* practical authority over their young children. I think that there's a presumption against someone being subject to another's practical authority, but that it holds in the case of rational agents with reasonably mature deliberative capacities.
ReplyDeleteThat presumption sounds right in the realm of people, but surely our rationality isn't even infantile compared to God's, so you'd think he'd have as much natural practical authority over us as a being can have.
ReplyDeleteBut it's not really the size of gap between the rational deliberative capacities of parents and children that grounds the relationship of authority; it's the fact that the capacities of their young children haven't developed enough to count as reasonably mature rational agents. Normal adults have, though, despite the fact that their capacities are much, much less developed as compared to God.
ReplyDeleteI don't know on what basis you make that final assertion, though. Our notion of a reasonably mature rational agent is one that works for helping to decide legitimate authoritative relations between humans, not between humans and God. (I'm pretty sure God's got my back on this one.)
ReplyDeleteThe thought is that reasonably mature rational, deliberative agency implies self-determination, which grounds the presumption. Or, being a reasonably mature rational, deliberative agent confers a moral status that grounds the presumption. In either case, so long as the relevant threshold for deliberative agency is met, the distance in capacities between agents is irrelevant to establishing that one has practical authority over the other. I take God *offering* the law, rather than *imposing* it, to be at least some evidence for this.
ReplyDeleteThe relevant threshold for rational deliberative agency is not set, however. It changes as standards change, which they certainly have over time. Behavior that would be regarded as psychotically violent today would have been seen as reasonable response to insult or injury even a century ago, for example. In my hopeful version of a hundred years hence, the vast majority of 8th graders will have a grasp of statistics and probability that only professional statisticians have today. When that happens, the adults of today will be regarded as having the deliberative capacities of children. It is the distance that has been created since then that justifies the rise in standards. What was good enough before is simply not now.
ReplyDeleteThank you for the interesting post and discussion.
ReplyDeleteHere’s my two cents worth: In order for a contract to be valid it must be entered into with autonomous choice. If God says “Randy do what I say or you will burn in a lake of fire” that threat would be enough to throw into doubt whether or not I was agreeing to this contract autonomously. My choice to enter into this contract would be shaped by an external constraint and being sufficiently free of both internal and external constraints is a generally agree upon requisite of an autonomous action.
To look at it from a virtues perspective; Kant argued true virtue demands that we act out of respect for a rule not simply in accordance with it. If God demands I follow her rule and I do so because she is all powerful and I am afraid of punishment then my behavior is both servile and self-interested.
Kyle, this is one of the most thoughtful deliberations about moral authority as presented in divine command theory I've seen lately. But like the others I have seen and considered, I can't help but wonder whether it confuses where the authority lies. If moral authority resides within a being such that when that being expresses a directive there is immediate and implicit moral reason to do what is directed, then we have a problem with the concept of morality at play. If the divine commands and I obey, then we'd have to ask whether that obedience is motivated by my recognition of that being as a moral authority -- such that their commands are thus morally authoritative and actually do create normative reasons for action -- or whether that obedience is motivated by some contingent other fact about that being -- such as their ability to award salvation or to damn eternally. If I'm motivated to obey, because of my dread of smiting or my desire for eternal salvation, then the authority of the command lies in its relation to my desires and fears. But, if I my obedience is motivated by my recognition of the moral authority of God -- that is, that God is an authority on morality such that she issues commands that are morally worthy of obedience -- then authority of the command lies in the relation of God to moral worth or goodness. Either way, the moral authority of the command is largely independent of the issuer of it. That's what makes Plato's Euthyphro such a compelling treatment of the subject some 2500 years on. This way of thinking about moral authority allows you to address Randy's concern about parents. The authority of the parent's command to the child is either independent of the parent because the reason it provides for action is due to its relation to moral worth or goodness (thus giving it moral authority), or due to its relation to the child's fears or desires (thus giving it prudential authority, not moral authority). The fact that the command is issued by the child's parent is not what gives it moral authority.
ReplyDeleteRandy, I think this isn’t a good account of agency. For starters, I think it confuses having the capacity to deliberate and settle on a plan of action and utilize principles of action in decision making with utilizing this capacity in ways we think would be better or best.
ReplyDeleteBut I don’t think this matters very much since the issue is practical authority, rather than theoretical authority (like the authority of an expert). Fallible beings like us have reason place ourselves under God’s authority, or, for that matter, maybe even that of the hyper-rational 8th graders of the future. There are good reasons to listen to experts and God’s attributes are such that the Israelites in the story above made a good choice to submit to him. But that doesn’t obviously establish the relevant sense of authority.
Chris, I agree with you (and Randy L) that the motive of fearful obedience provides the wrong kind of reason for the sort of thing we’re interested in. Set that aside. The other option you suggest (the authority of independent moral goodness) doesn’t seem to be the only other way to go. It’s a good thing, too. “Line up your actions with moral goodness” isn’t really an operable principle. It’s just way too indeterminate. So the only thing that recommends steering clear of pork (rather than, say, poultry) for observant Jews is God’s determination. The only thing that makes ‘dinner before dessert’ the thing for my kids to do (rather than ‘dessert before dinner’) is the say-so of my wife and I. Right-side driving doesn’t line up with moral goodness any more or less than left-side driving, but the law here makes the former the thing to do. In each case (and many, many others) there could be reasons for making something else the thing to do and only an arbitrary determination by a practical authority makes the difference.
ReplyDeleteKyle, thanks for your response to my comment. It's had me thinking. But, I think you missed an important element of my comments. I'm not suggesting that, as a practical matter, we ought to line up our actions with moral goodness. I agree that's unhelpfully vague and indeterminate. However, your alternative seems to be that we need someone to make a determination, parents in the case of the order of food consumption (meal before desert, not vice versa) and law in the case of driving on the right (not the left or wherever there is space). For the law and parents to be considered sources with moral authority such that their commands warrant obedience as moral commands, there must be some relation between them or at the least their commands and some conception of the good, even if it is not goodness in its Platonic form. Otherwise, moral authority is indistinguishable from practical authority or efficient/effective authority. Meal before desert might be just how you have always understood the proper order of food consumption, something customary or traditional. Maybe a physiological story could be told about the digestive tract, nutrient absorption, metabolic efficiency, etc, to justify meals before desert, but that would be to provide medical authority to the parents. For the parents to have moral authority, all of that has to align somehow with some set of values worth pursuing -- moral worth has to enter the picture somehow for the command to have normative sway. Something like, proper nutrition is necessary for the development of physical and mental health, which are conducive to living a happy life, to fulfilling your obligations as a member of society, etc. Parents know this, their command to finish dinner before desert has moral authority, not because at some point someone has to decide things. But then this would make the command right for any kids not just yours. Your command would have moral authority beyond your kids, as well, not because they are your kids but because the command corresponds to some understanding of what is good. Similarly for law, it doesn't matter whether we drive on the left or the right, but it does matter that directional driving is sorted somehow, otherwise the risk to life and limb of being on the road (or near it) would be unacceptably high. That the law settles it, not me, not my parents, is an acknowledgment of the law as an authority. But that authority derives from law's close relation to, at the least, a community's conception(s) of the good or the commonweal, or to shared interests the meeting of which entails shared obligations of restraint and order. Also, that parents or law or god can be questioned as to the moral authority of their commands implies that there is some parent or law or god independent means for assessing the normative authority of the commands. What do you think?
ReplyDeleteI more or less think that the entire set of practical principles we have reason to endorse for the pursuit of choiceworthy goals are mostly indeterminate (e.g., “Don’t steal.” But what counts as stealing? What property rules will we use to settle disputes about rights to use and exclude? What about intellectual property? What about confiscatory taxation?). As long as our having some principle governing it is better for us than not having any guiding principle at all, then we are likely to need some determination for how we are to act in accord with the principle. I’m interpreting a divine command theory along these lines. Theists should think we have reason to submit to God’s authority with respect to His determination of all practical principles – endorse His willing for our lives – in order to solve a kind of coordination problem that we have reason (each of us, from our own points of view) to solve.
ReplyDeleteWhen and if people do so God commanding something would constitute a reason to do it, but, until and unless they do, God doesn’t have the relevant normative authority over them. The point is, then, that a divine command normative ethical theory needn’t follow what I referred to above as an externalist approach, according to which the deliverances of the moral theory, merely as deliverances of that theory, magically bind us. The principles associated with the theory, and the norms derived from them, must have some kind of ‘uptake’ with people if they are going to be genuinely (and authoritatively) normative. We identify with His will, sign on to His team, internalize His directives, etc. I was thinking that this accommodates your worry about needing some conception of the good to ground moral authority.
According to the bible, prior to Mount Sinai the people of Israel were under a grace-based covenant. However, on the way to Mount Sinai they were complaining and groaning although God had saved them. Then at the mount they say, “We will do everything the LORD has said" and sign up for the covenant. Here they open themselves up to the authority of God but it is not practical or arbitrary. They do this for reasons to benefit themselves, not just because God said so. I think it can be interpreted as: rather than trust the grace of God (which had been given to them) to help guide and confirm that their own moral values are in line with God's the Israelites instead chose a law in which they sort of give up their own morality and hand all authority over to God rather than go through the mental task of deliberating whether they line up with God. So, this makes it contingent and the practical authority of divine command theory fails. However, perhaps it fails because that is never how God intended it to be, God only gave them the covenant because they wanted an easy way out of morality. Maybe God never wanted to give his people laws to blindly follow.
ReplyDeleteThis is mostly right, Enrique, but there were other covenants with different terms prior to the one at Sinai. So I'm not sure it's as stark a contrast between trusting in God's grace or entering into a legal covenant. Covenants, even the latter sort, can be gracious. And the covenant at Sinai was special in that it intentionally set apart what was before a nomadic ramshackle group as a nation special to God. It was the fulfillment of a prior promise, rather than a response to some kind of lack of trust. At least that's how it reads to me, but we're definitely approaching the outer limits of my theological training.
DeleteBut -- more central to the point I was making in the post -- I don't think the contingency of the arrangement diminishes God's practical authority with respect to the Israelites, as you suggested. The idea is that these people voluntarily agreed to the covenant, which made God a practical authority for them.
Kyle,
ReplyDeleteThe DCT and Korsgaards reflective deliberation seem to lack human inability, sensibility, and real human agency in nature. They seem to answer the question of “Why be rational?” But they don’t seem to answer the question “Why be moral?” Whether practical authority is commanded by God(DCT) or individually legislated from practical identity(Korsgaard); you either value God or yourself. What if you choose not to value you either? Does this make you amoral? I don’t think so. Being moral seems to be contingent on a rational being but rational beings make bad ethical choices all the time. Understanding the Bible or myself doesn’t make me choose the right ethical choice, but it might help discipline my moral practices.
I'm having trouble following your line of thought, Ryan, but let me try to answer the part I think I get and, if you like, you can follow up and clarify.
DeleteIn any sort of contract theory of morality, the moral rules just are the ones that parties to the contract agreed would have the relevant reason-giving force in deliberations about what to do. The question "why be moral?" is no different than "why follow the rules I agreed to?" or "why agree to them?"
The idea that commands that God issues are prescriptive because of a sort of contract that one has with God solves some problems, but raises others. It solves the problem of why we could use Divine Command Theory as the standard for morals, although at high cost. That cost is that it doesn't have to be God that creates the standard. It is a Command Theory that could be issued by anyone; such as, government enacted (which is already partially true in our world), community agreeance, or any institution setting up a list of rules and having others agree to it.
ReplyDeleteBut, if it is still desired to keep the Divine as part of the theory, then it could be said that what makes the rules listed correct is that they are decided upon by a divine being that knows what is right or wrong. That would give it strength as to what the correct form of moral action is and why it should be agreed to in such a way. Although this does not account for atheists and the like. They could agree, much like Joyce points out, that Divine Command Theory has the most accurate guidelines for morals but see no reason to follow it because they have no belief in God.
It seems like a difficult task for this theory to gain much traction. As soon as it solves the problem of what is the right choice of action, i.e., because God commands it, it has the difficulty of getting any people on board outside of specific religious circles.
We can distinguish, two questions, Tyler:
Delete1. For any person, is that person subject to God's authority?
2. For any person, would that person do best by doing as God commands?
Since theists think that God exists and has all the divine perfections, they're committed to thinking that the answer to 2 is 'yes.' But a 'yes' answer to 2 doesn't imply a 'yes' answer to 1. 1 is a question about whether God's command itself constitutes a reason, even a decisive reason, to act a certain way.
To put it another way: theists are committed to the idea that everyone would do best to submit themselves to divine rule, but God's dictates (as such) are authoritative only for those that have done that.
When I was a kid my parents had an amazing power that not even God could had over me. I agreed to go to school, shower, go to sleep at certain time, be home at certain time, all these things made sense they had a reason that I was able to comprehend. I say I was a good kid, most of the things that the rules they set for me, I followed. However, there was one thing that bother me, annoyed me, made me mad, and I completely did not understand. That was attend to church every Sunday and on any occasion that it was required. First of all I could not understand why so many people were into that, why was church so important. Then I was introduced to God and for some magical reason he had that power of "divine command" that we ought to act in accordance to his word. However, I've never felt anything different when I acted in what could be said to be immoral, as a child, I could not see him. I also heard about crimes and wars and all this stuff that was not supposed to be happening, according to God, so I wonder what are you doing God? Where are you? Long story short, it is not the fact that I am dumb enough to do not understand it and I do get that this practices do help people live their lives in peace. However, it just appears to me that if there was a God, I do not think that he would be able to command anything, because this world and the whole universe needs to follow the laws of nature and to interact or change it God would be doing something that God should not be doing. I just can't see what would be the reason for it existence there is not need, but of course I might be wrong.
ReplyDeleteJaime, part of the point of the post was to argue that God's power to direct people to do (or not do) things isn't magical at all. At least, if we assume God exists, then his power to do this isn't any more magical than the power anyone would have who has secured the relevant sort of practical authority.
Delete1) The Israelites belief in God is of God being an entity external to themselves, but that belief is always one that is internal to the believer. To say otherwise would be to affirm the existence or non-existence of God, for which there is not sufficient evidence to do either. Thus the reasons the Israelites had were still internal to themselves, regardless if there is actually an entity for those reasons and beliefs to correspond to. That is, even if there was/is/will be an external source which provided these reasons and beliefs, the Israelites would have to internalize them, or come to believe in them themselves, in order for them to act accordingly to what they require. No BBQ in this case. For someone who hasn’t internalized the word of God, or come to believe in God, the reasons God provides will not move them. You gotta have faith.
ReplyDelete2) Certainly if a student takes your class, your assigning a paper gives them a reason to write a paper. It does not necessarily convey any authority that they must write that paper, either at all or as intended. The question is, who is the authority of the student’s education? K-12, unequivocally it’s the teacher. But college?... It’s the students. Unlike k-12, students pick their classes. Students decide whether or not to go to class. It is students who spend countless hours a week reading texts, doing homework, writing essays, not to mention accumulating student debt along the way, for which they receive two and a half hours per week of lecture. (Compared to three hours forty five minutes of instruction per week in high school that we didn’t have to pay extra for.)
3) There is every requirement and reason that the professor, the department, the college, the university, family, and society has upon the student to do whatever is required. But on top of these, the student has their own personal reasons for going to college, choosing a particular major, a particular class, even their own reasons for wanting to do particular assignments. To that end, on top of what they are being asked to learn or do by the professor, college, etc,..., students may have their own list of things they want to learn and do as part of their education and classes.
4) Students will and do yield their authority to professors provided they continue to believe that the education they are receiving will properly serve them in acting upon their inter-academic and post-academic goals, reasons, and motivations, for taking the class or seeking an education in the first place.
5) Now..., where some students see essays as an assignment requiring work, others may see them as an opportunity to write further on something interesting to them related to the text, or to develop some further skills, or whatever more it is they want to achieve when given an assignment that relates with their own reasons for doing it. But if upon receiving the assignment, the student determines that those other goals can’t be met, the student will lose faith in that assignment’s abilities to further their personal inter-academic or post-academic goals. If the professor is unwilling to alter the assignment to accommodate those further goals the student has, then the student may lose faith in that professor’s and the class’s ability to help them learn and develop the further knowledge and skills the student was seeking. At which point, the assigning of an essay may longer convey the same authority to the student as when they believed their own goals could also be met via the assignment. It’s not great when that happens, but the student will usually still do the assignment because they don’t want to suffer the consequences of not doing it.
6) When this is the rare occurrence for students, they will just do the assignment. But if this becomes a pattern where the student perceives it to be the case that their goals for seeking the education aren’t being met by the assignments or the professor, then the student will cease to to have faith in that professor, and will retain themselves as the authority of their own education. At which point the student might drop the class, or just not write the essay.
ReplyDelete7) Inevitably, the authority the professor has in giving students reasons, is no different than the authority of God to give reasons to the Israelites. One’s acceptance of another’s authority is contingent on the faith one has in that person or entity. No faith...No authority… and except for one’s own… No reasons. (If the student does the paper out of a fear of consequences, it is the consequences that convey the authority to the student, not the professor.)
Anon, just to be clear, I'm using "practical authority" the way most moral and political philosophers do -- a moral power to create reasons for action. The post is in part a reflection on what it probably takes to secure that -- something like consent. You raise an interesting question about exit. How does one get out from under the authority of another? This is an important question in contemporary political philosophy. As far as the ancient Israelites went, there were provisions for it, but it was wicked hard -- much harder than dropping a college course.
ReplyDelete1) The initial discussion of the Israelites was in regards to “moral authority”, and it was understood that the example of the professor’s authority was of a more “practical” nature. I ask, what is distinctively “practical”, and how is it that ”practical authority” does not fall within the domain of “moral authority”? All authority carries a distinctively moral and ethical character, adding “practical” or any other word in front of it doesn’t detract from that. Thus ‘practical authority’ is a form of “moral authority”.
Delete2) Regardless, the argument I presented does not consider any narrow definitions of ‘authority’. Specifically in 2) “It does not necessarily convey ‘any’ authority…”. The wording in my statements and arguments are implicitly making the claim that they pertain to any and/ or all forms of ‘authority’. Which is presumably the similar assumption being made in your post as well, otherwise it wouldn’t make sense for us to compare the two as related examples. I suppose you could look at my argument/ response as discussing or being about ‘exit conditions’, but since I’ve never heard of the concept before, I really doubt that to be the case.
3) In particular, my argument illustrates the contingency by which a person or entity who claims to have some form of authority over another is able to convey that authority to them. Just as with God, the authority conveyed by a professor is contingent upon the new or continued faith and belief of the individual in perceiving/ evaluating God or the professor as a worthy figure of authority. Same applies to the authority of rules/ laws/ governments.
4) What these various entities have is ‘power’, but one can have power without the authority to exert it, and even one who rightfully has power has no authority over those who do not agree. But in that these entities have some power or control over the lives of others regardless their own faiths or beliefs, individuals will often acquiesce to that power for fear of any negative consequences for disobeying. In bringing about consequences on the individual, it is an exercise of power, not authority. As much as the entity in question may have the authority to enact consequences, they may and often do have the authority to withhold those consequences as well. Thus in enacting consequences, it is not authority that is conveyed, but power.
5) The individual however will fear some or all of these consequences and wish to avoid them. Thus they may choose to obey the entity who has power to avoid those consequences. But it is then the individual’s own fear that conveys the authority of any directives to provide them reasons for action, as it would be somewhat irrelevant who or what the entity is if the fear and consequences remain the same.
6) In that my argument makes authority contingent on ‘faith’, I suppose then having a lack of faith fulfills some necessary condition for ‘exiting’ from beneath the authority or power of another. But I should make the distinction that while simple lacking of faith may be sufficient reason for the individual to excuse themselves from beneath the power/ authority another has, it is not necessarily a sufficient condition for the entity who has power/ authority to excuse them. Thus, the lack of faith must be further justified as to provide sufficient reason to the entity who has power/ authority to excuse the individual from their control/ requirements.
7) Which is why it’s important to be able to develop those other/ further skills and knowledge that the original essay on Hume didn’t call for or develop as part of its’ own inherent design as an assignment; knowledge and skills necessary to sufficiently justify one’s lack of faith to an entity in power. Sorry if all this wasn’t clear, but I was trying to keep it relatively short.
Thanks, anon, for trying to keep it short :)
DeleteAgain, I'm talking about practical authority the way most moral and political philosophers do. There, practical authority is a normative power to create reasons for action. A issues a directive, and those with respect to whom A has authority (if there are any) are obligated to act in accordance with it. But this isn't always distinctively moral. If A is a professor and the directive is to write a paper on a topic, the authority is merely pedagogical (or something like that). If A is a state and the directive is to drive on the right side of the road, the authority is political. If A is God and the directive is to avoid baby-back ribs, the authority is moral.
As far as I can tell, the rest of what you say is compatible with the original post. As I said before, much that seems to raise questions related to exiting a relationship of practical authority that's been previously established. That's an interesting and vexed issue, especially in the political domain, but the post wasn't really about that.
Prof. Swan,
ReplyDeleteYou touched on this briefly in your post, but to what extent do religious peoples voluntarily enter into a 'contract' to adhere to God's moral system, and to what extent do they have internal reasons to act?
In the story of the Israelites at Mt. Sinai, the Israelites became impatient during one of Moses' many audiences with God and went through a great effort to construct a deity of their own, the golden calf. This action appears to speak to the Israelites feeling that they had the freedom to choose whether or not they were required to adhere to God and God's moral system. If they felt they had that freedom, would that not point to the idea that they voluntarily entered into the 'contract' Moses presented? If that was true, would that not point to the idea that they had in some sense internalized reasons to adhere to God's moral system? It would certainly be the case that if they had not felt that they had a choice whether or not to enter into this contract with God that it would not be voluntary and certainly there would be no internal reasons to act.
Due to technical difficulties with this site, this is my fifth attempt at posting, and I have lost three of said attempts. As a result, my reply has become less and less coherent, so take it as you will. :)
Sorry you had problems with this site. But this is a useful example to work through, Eric. Thanks. The Golden Calf (let's call it) Incident occurred after the people gave their accent in vs. 8. So the straightforward reading is that they agreed to a set of rules, which for their own (internal) reasons seemed good to them. Among them was one that said not to worship idols. In a moment of weakness or fear or whatever they decided to do it anyway, thereby breaking the covenant and subjecting themselves to the covenant punishments.
DeleteIt is perhaps somewhat puzzling that they would do what they knew or should have known was on the 'don't do' list after agreeing not to do it. But not, I dare say, entirely unfamiliar to us. So I don't know that we should infer from their disobedience that there was something off about the agreement.
Thanks, Knute. A lot depends on one's view of hell. Here are some possibilities for those who reject the terms of God's covenant:
ReplyDelete1. Hell is punishment for rejecting the terms of God's covenant.
2. Hell is punishment, but not for rejecting the terms of God's covenant; rather, for doing other bad stuff that people knew better than to do.
3. Hell isn't punishment at all; rather, it's a state of separation from God, which is just want people who rejected the terms of his covenant want(ed).
There are of course other views concerning hell, according to which no one goes there and everyone gets reconciled with God. Of all these various views, only 1. above is incompatible with the account I give in the post.
A quick note about 2. There actually are narratives in a couple books about God's temporal punishment of Edom, but not for violating the covenant he made with the Israelites. You can see this for a comparison of the Noahic and Mosaic covenants: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covenant_(biblical)#Noahic_covenant. But basically this idea is that, unlike the one at Sinai with Israel, the former is a unilateral covenant God makes promising to protect his creation. In particular, God says he'll "require a reckoning" (ominous!) from anyone that takes another life.