So I’ve got marriage equality on my mind. Or—making some assumptions—on my brain. Assume two parts of my brain—“Righty” and “Lefty”—can think and talk. (The names map—poorly—cerebral hemispheres, not the political spectrum.) Neither reflects the views of the mentioned authors, or pretends to be up to speed on the literatures concerning marriage equality. Listen and see if you can help each think better.
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Righty: I believe in marriage equality.
Lefty: Me too, but it depends what you mean by it.
R: Well let’s pretend I’m a straight woman and you’re a gay man…
L: Umm…
R: …and let’s pretend we live somewhere that says marriage is only between one man and one woman…
L: Fine.
R: Then I think marriage equality means that people like you should be allowed to marry, just as people like me are.
L: But we already can.
R: No you can’t. Not here and now. Remember what we're pretending.
L: I do. If I want to marry, I just have to find a woman who agrees to marry me.
R: Wait, that is not what I mean. You can’t marry someone like you—someone who is attracted to a person of the same sex.
L: Sure I can. I just have to find a woman who agrees to marry me and is attracted to a person of the same sex. Elton and Ellen can marry each other just as equally as Kanye and Kim can.
R: But that is still not what I mean. Neither Elton nor Ellen can marry someone of the same sex.
L: So? Neither can Kanye or Kim.
R: But that’s different. They don’t want to marry someone of the same sex.
L: So?
R: So marriage equality means that individuals can marry each other whenever they want to.
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L: If marriage equality meant that, you would be fine with polygamy and many other kinds of ‘marriages’. But you aren’t. So it doesn’t.
R: Ah, that’s a common move. Some are fine with some of those things, but let’s pretend I’m not.
L: OK…
R: I guess my view is this…Marriage means two unrelated legal adults in a consensual, exclusive, life-long—or at least long-term—romantic commitment. Marriage equality means individuals of the same sex can get married to each other, just as individuals of the opposite sex can get married to each other. What’s your view?
L: Marriage, among other things, is an inherently bisexual institution. Marriage equality, among other things, means individuals should have equal opportunity to enter this institution.
*
R: Um, “bisexual”?
L: Two-sexed. Compare: a bicameral legislature has two chambers; a biracial couple represents two races. And so on.
R: But the word “bisexual” already has another standard meaning when applied to individuals.
L: Fine. Pick other prefixes. Instead of labeling the sexual composition of institutions “bi-” and “uni-” we could label them “hetero-” and “homo-” when the sex of their members is different or the same.
L: But that makes inherently homosexual institutions out of the Boy Scouts of America and the Gay Men’s Chorus.
R: True. But not because it’s the Gay Men’s Chorus, but because it’s the Gay Men’s Chorus. Inherently homosexual institutions would be so labeled not because their individual members are homosexual, but because their individual members are of the same sex.
R: Again, the word “homosexual” already has another standard meaning when applied to individuals.
L: Fine. I’m willing to use labels like “same-sex” and “different-sex” to make the point. My view is that marriage is an inherently different-sex institution. One or both individuals within it can be bisexual, homosexual, heterosexual, pan-sexual, or whatever. Individuals have equal opportunity to enter this institution.
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R: Why is marriage inherently different-sex? What makes anything inherently anything?
L: I doubt I can answer the general question. But perhaps one answer to the specific question is this: there are such things as inherently different-sex institutions; and marriage is one.
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R: Show me there are such things as inherently different-sex institutions.
L: Imagine a father took his young girls out for individual ice cream outings, and called these “daddy-daughter dates.”
R: Ah, I see. A daddy-daughter date is an inherently different-sex institution?
L: Yes. And even though it wasn’t contrived to be that way just by naming it with capitalized words like “An Inherently Different-sex Institution.”
R: But there’s nothing remotely sexual about this different-sex institution.
L: Right. Just as there’s nothing remotely sexual about the same-sex institution of the Boy Scouts.
R: Are you sure the daddy-daughter date is inherently different-sex?
L: Yes. When the father’s young boy reached the age for ice cream outings, they could not go on a daddy-daughter date together. They invented a similar institution and they called it a “father-son adventure” instead. Which, of course, was inherently same-sex—but not out of animus towards the daughters.
R: Could they call it a “daddy-son date” instead?
L: Indeed, they could call it anything at all.
R: Why?
L: The words we slap on these institutions do not make them different-sex or same-sex institutions any more than words like “five” and “six” make natural numbers odd or even.
R: Could they make a more general and gender-neutral institution and call it a “parent-child outing”?
L: Of course! But daddy-daughter dates, mother-son banquets, brother-sister breakfasts, and a thousand other imaginable institutions are inherently different-sex. And father-son adventures, mother-daughter empowerment trips, sister-sister flame grill barbecues, and a thousand other such institutions are inherently same-sex.
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R: Let’s say I agree so far. You still haven’t shown that marriage is an inherently different-sex institution.
(This is the first of a two-part post.)
Russell DiSilvestro
Department of Philosophy
Sacramento State
Russell,
ReplyDeleteThanks for this rumination on marriage equality. With the understanding that this is the first of two posts, I hope you'll entertain a comment on this one.
I'm a bit concerned that Lefty's understanding of marriage equality as something everyone has the opportunity to engage in because a gay man could always find a woman to marry and a lesbian could always find a man to marry, just as readily as a heterosexual couple could marry each other. The concern I have is that this is a too narrow understanding of equality of opportunity. The opportunity to marry is not just to find anyone with whom to enter into the institution of marriage, as one might search for a room-mate on Craig's List. But rather, as heterosexual couples marry, they do so with the person they love, with whom they wish to build a life, perhaps also raise a family, and share the joys and sorrows of a life lived together.
Lefty's suggestion that we already have marriage equality because anyone could find someone of the opposite sex to marry leaves this dimension of marriage entirely out of the picture. Sue, a lesbian, might well be able to marry good friend Fred, who is also gay, but she cannot marry her lover Mary, to whom she is committed and with whom she wants nothing more than to build a life and raise a flock of kids… and to do so with all the same benefits and responsibilities as a married couple.
Marriage, is not merely an institution, but a formal expression of a kind of relationship, which since at least the last few hundred years (perhaps ideally always) has been more and more primarily a relationship of sexual or romantic love and commitment. Ted and Pam, both heterosexual and deeply in love with each other, have access to marriage TOGETHER, with one another, with the one they love and with whom they each want to build a life. It seems to me that Lefty's understanding of marriage equality denies THIS opportunity to Sue and Mary, while allowing Sue and Fred to marry but in name only. So, in terms of treating Sue and Mary and Pam and Ted (for that matter, Fred and his love Roger) equally, it seems to me that Lefty's conception of marriage equality, and any laws premised upon it, fails to treat them equally.
The concern is not merely opportunity to access the institution with all the benefits and responsibilities that pertain to it. But, the opportunity to access it on equal terms, as equals, enjoying the benefits and responsibilities of marriage equally. Currently, laws which prohibit same-sex marriage, would deny Sue and Mary the opportunity granted to Ted and Pam. Indeed, Fred and Sue would similarly be denied the opportunity which Ted and Pam are granted, because Ted and Pam can each marry the love of their life, each other. While Sue and Fred, while able to marry each other, are each denied the opportunity to marry their respective loves of their lives. Mere opportunity to marry someone is not the equivalent, nor is it to treat as equal, those who have the opportunity to marry the individual they love, merely because they are not oppositely sexed lovers. Any conception of marriage equality would have to address no just a bare or minimal (formal) equality of opportunity for individuals, but the equality of the individuals and the relationship between them. Marriage is about accessing an institutionally recognized kind of relationship WITH a particular other individual, not just any other, but THIS other individual.
Not long ago, many very bright and well-meaning people argued that marriage is not only inherently a matter for couples of opposite sexes, but also inherently a matter only for couples of the same-race. As we liberated the institution (and conception) of marriage from that “inherent” property, perhaps it is now time to liberate marriage from this “inherent” property, as well. Just a suggestion….
Like Chris, I'm suspicious of Left's narrow understanding marriage equality. I don't like that kind of argument when Left and George, et al. use it to conclude there are no equality issues raised by rules forbidding same-sex marriage, just like I don't like that kind of argument when Peter Singer uses it here (http://host.madison.com/news/opinion/column/peter-singer-the-use-and-abuse-of-religious-freedom/article_b95c35b6-b72c-11e1-86be-0019bb2963f4.html) to conclude that there are no religious freedom issues raised by rules that would require Jews and Muslims to render animals unconscious before they slaughter them for food or by rules that would require Roman Catholic employers to provide their employees health care that covers contraception.
ReplyDeleteKyle,
ReplyDeleteOh my gosh, we agree! But (sorry, fleeting, I know), I'm not sure the parallel holds. In the marriage situation, saying Sue can get married if she just gives up being lesbian, or hoping to marry Mary, is parallel to telling a Jewish butcher that she is equally free to slaughter a lamb after it has first been made unconscious, if she just stopped being Jewish. That I see. But, in the animal slaughtering situation, there is another morally considerable being at issue -- the animal slaughtered. Is there any other morally considerable being at issue in the marriage situation – that is, whose interests are protected by prohibiting same-sex marriage in the way animal cruelty laws prohibit slaughtering conscious animals?
Similarly, in situation of Catholic employers and their religious beliefs against contraception. To say that the Catholic employer can offer contraception coverage to his employees, of course assuming he can just stop being Catholic, is parallel to telling Sue she can indeed marry if she gives up being lesbian. But again, in the employer contraception case, there is another moral considerable being at issue... the employees. Except here, to allow a Catholic employer not to offer his employees contraception coverage creates an inequality between employees of Catholic employers and ALL others who access basic health coverage in every other way (whether employer covered or not). Recognizing religious liberty as a matter of equal protection for employers introduces an inequality between individuals according to how they obtain their health coverage. So, Fred who works for Notre Dame University does not have his contraception covered as a matter of basic health access, but Sue who works for Home Depot, does. Again, I think this undermines the parallel to the marriage equality situation. Laws preventing Sue from marrying Mary do not protect anyone else from unequal treatment. Contraceptive coverage was included in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to ensure everyone has access to the same basic coverage, regardless of where they got their health plan, because of a history of such discriminatory policies.
Of course, one plausible solution for employer inequality would be to remove employers from the basic health coverage equation altogether. Then they can be employers and have their religious liberty, too. And, a solution to the animal slaughtering inequality would be to remove animals from the food equation altogether... Halal and Kosher vegetarian, and no one has to bleed. Finally, a parallel solution would be to remove marriage from the loving, committed, family-building relationship equation altogether.... but some people really like that institution, and its benefits.
Just thinking out loud!
Chris, I wasn't suggesting that there aren't those other moral considerations. I was only talking about the argumentative strategy of making use of an overly narrow understanding of an idea (marriage equality, religious freedom) to conclude that a policy doesn't impinge. Singer didn't argue that rules requiring animals be unconscious for slaughter and mandated insurance coverage including contraception were justified because various moral considerations outweighed considerations of religious freedom. Rather, he argued that these policies didn't raise religious freedom issues at all. I disagree with the former argument, but it's not bad. Singer's argument (and the parallel George argument) is bad.
ReplyDeleteWell, in that case, then.... We agree!
ReplyDeleteChris and Kyle,
ReplyDeleteThanks for these typically thoughtful (and challenging) responses. Since Chris gives the more detailed objection and alternative proposal, I will focus on that.
(Alas, I must break this response up into chunks.)
Part of the dispute between you and Lefty is about how to identify the opportunities that need to be equalized by an ideal of equal opportunity in marriage.
Take four individuals named 1, 2, 3, and 4. Lefty would have us focus on these opportunities:
1 = 1’s opportunity to marry.
2 = 2’s opportunity to marry.
3 = 3’s opportunity to marry.
4 = 4’s opportunity to marry.
And Lefty would have us ask whether each of these is equal, as one (and perhaps the decisive) step in asking whether equal opportunity regarding marriage obtains. Is 1 = 2 = 3 = 4? If the answer is yes, we have marriage equality, at least of one sort. If the answer is no, we don’t have marriage equality, at least of one sort.
But you would have us focus on these opportunities as well (or instead):
12 = 1 and 2’s opportunity to marry each other.
13 = 1 and 3’s opportunity to marry each other.
14 = 1 and 4’s opportunity to marry each other.
23 = 2 and 3’s opportunity to marry each other.
34 = 3 and 4’s opportunity to marry each other.
And you would have us ask whether each of these is equal in asking whether equal opportunity regarding marriage obtains. Is 12 = 13 = 14 = 23 = 34? If the answer is yes, we have marriage equality, at least of one sort. If the answer is no, we don’t have marriage equality, at least of one sort.
Indeed, you go a bit further in contrasting “the mere opportunity to marry someone” with “the opportunity to marry the love of one’s life” – a significant wrinkle worth examining on its own terms in just a moment.
For now, let’s ignore that wrinkle. The first thing to note is this: on any definition of marriage, there are always going to be relationship opportunities that fall outside of the definition, and these relationship opportunities will thus not be necessary to take account of when trying to equalize marriage opportunity.
For example, assume for the sake of discussion a definition of marriage M: marriage means two adults, without restrictions of any sort upon sex. Now assume that 1, 2, 3, and 4 are men. On definition M, 1 = 2 = 3 = 4, and 12 = 13 = 14 = 23 = 34. But notice, M tells us to completely ignore, when equalizing opportunity for marriage, the opportunity for three-person marriages like 123, 124, 134, and 234. M also tells us to ignore the opportunity for four-person marriages like 1234. And so on. For any number N besides two, M tells us to ignore the possibility for N-person marriages.
Indeed, M also leaves out the possibility of one-person or Narcissist marriages, for an individual to marry himself or herself (which we could represent for individuals 1, 2, 3, and 4 with labels 11, 22, 33, and 44). If you say that the concept of one-person or Narcissist marriage is incoherent, because it fails to respect a necessary condition of marriage—namely, that marriage is an inherently multiple-person relation—then welcome to the club of those who suspect that marriage may have some inherent features after all (but why? Perhaps history…or the intentions of its inventors?).
So, then, for those who would like to have the opportunity to marry into three-somes, four-somes, or one-somes, M seems like it may be a sort of inequality. (To adapt the third sentence of your fifth paragraph, Chris, “Currently, laws which prohibit three-some marriage, would deny 1 and 2 and 3 the opportunity granted to 1 and 2.”)
Russell,
DeleteWow... you've reminded me that analytic philosophy does give me a headache sometimes. But, please see my response to your part II. I'm not so much interested in finding inherent properties and definitions of things, especially social institutions, as I'm interested in the practice itself and how we can make sense of it. I'm also, not averse, as you imply, to multiple partner marriages. If, Bill, and Henry, and Fran want to get married, I'm not sure I'd object to it, certainly not along historical or originalist lines (not least because history is rife with examples of institutions of marriage which are exactly that). What I object to are the kinds of multiple marriages we are more familiar with, both contemporary and historical, which build on and reinforce patriarchal sex and gender roles. But that might be another story for another time.
The obvious way forward for a defender of M at this point would be to accent the fact that 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 have equal opportunity to marry. This move, of course, shifts the heavy lifting of the discussion off of “equal opportunity” and onto “marriage” (i.e. it shifts the focus onto why we should think of marriage just as a two-person relation).
ReplyDeleteBut of course, if this way forward is philosophically acceptable for M, it is hard to see why it is not philosophically acceptable for Lefty. I am not claiming that this move is a blank check for writing anything on. But it does seem to be a move that has to be made by every approach to marriage seeking to divide up the intellectual labor of defining what marriage is and explaining what sort of equal opportunity that leaves us with.
I confess to not know how equal opportunity should be construed across a wide range of issues. (And I suspect I’m not alone in not knowing this.) But it does seem to me that one way of thinking somewhat more clearly about equal opportunity is to restrict our focus to giving individual persons equal opportunity in some dimension, rather than trying to give N-tuples of people equal opportunity together in some dimension.
But let me circle back to the wrinkle you introduced when you claimed that equality of opportunity needs to keep an eye on “the opportunity to marry the love of one’s life”. I think I see what you are getting at here, but I also think I see this opening up more trouble than it is worth as a focus for equal opportunity, and quite apart from the issue of same-sex marriage. For again, assume for the sake of discussion that something like M is the correct definition of marriage and that 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all men. But now assume that 1 loves 2 as the love of his life; 2 loves 1 as the love of his life; but 3 also loves 1 as the love of his (3’s) life; and 4 is such a Narcissist that the love of his life is himself. M gives 1 and 2 what it circumstantially denies to 3, and what it necessarily denies to 4: the opportunity to marry the love of one’s life. But is this seriously a shortcoming for M? It is hard to see that it is.
You might think that this is only an issue for those, like 3, who are Unlucky or Unrequited in love (in that the love of their life is “taken” or non-reciprocal), or for those, like 4, who are Narcissists at the other end of the spectrum (always lucky to have themselves). But it’s not that simple. Shuffle the love relations a bit, and the same problem emerges in different ways:
Imagine a traditional love triangle, where 1 loves 2 and 3 equally as the loves (plural) of his life, but while 2 and 3 each love 1 as the love (singular) of his life, 2 and 3 do not love each other at all.
Or imagine a one-directional love triangle; where 1 loves 2 as the love of his life, 2 loves 3 as the love of his life, 3 loves 1 as the love of his life, but the reverse relations are not loving.
Or imagine a two-directional love triangle, where each loves the other two equally.
In these and others more complex still—love quads, love pentagons (motto: “make love, not war”), the relevant result is that M denies some individuals the opportunity to marry the love(s) of their lives. But is this a sign that M runs shallow on equality of opportunity? Again, I doubt it. But this suggests that the opportunity to marry the love of your life is just not the sort of thing that equality of opportunity need cognize.
The same sorts of thing, I believe, should be said about your claim that “Marriage is about accessing an institutionally recognized kind of relationship WITH a particular other individual, not just any other, but THIS other individual.” While I recognize the moral importance of love’s particularity, I think it is important to bracket that from equality of opportunity. No matter how much I may want to marry a particular individual—and no matter how much that individual may want to marry me—this is just not the sort of thing that equal opportunity should pay attention to.
ReplyDeleteTo see why, think for just a moment about a very popular person, or celebrity, named C. Many people may sincerely want to marry C—not just anyone, but this individual C. (Don’t think of conventional rock stars, but rock star philosophers.) Still, the fact that a marriage definition—like M—prevents all but one of those people from marrying the particular individual that they most want to marry is not the sort of thing that counts against that definition in terms of equality of opportunity. And we would say the same thing even if C managed to reciprocate the love for more than one of C’s most devoted fans (as celebrities have sometimes been known to do).
The point of this response is that any account of marriage—Lefty’s, Righty’s, M’s, and so on—eventually has to divide up the task of defining marriage from the task of explaining how equality of various morally important types—like equality of opportunity—functions vis a vis that definition. And it is not yet clear to me that the advantages of your alternative(s) outweigh their disadvantages, when compared with Lefty’s proposal.
Russell, I'm feeling like you're elaborating a classic slippery slope argument in disguise here. Since we cannot possibly accommodate everyone's peculiarities within a single definition of marriage, you suggest we draw the line here, at different-sex couples, one man one woman. If this is too harsh a criticism, then let me identify the project of finding a single defining or inherent property which makes marriage marriage as the problem. I'm wary of such efforts in most regards, not least with regard to social institutions, and less so with ones that have been around a very long time, changed over the course of that time, and with which we are amply able to play at the current time. Maybe this is the kind of debate that prompted Locke to write his First Treatise of Government.
DeleteRussell, what if someone claims that religious worship is inherently the kind of thing that requires the Tridentine Mass (in Latin!). It looks like Left's argument permit us to say that a policy prohibiting other kinds of worship practices (or "worship" practices!) wouldn't violate people's equal opportunity to worship. Does left make any mistake below?
ReplyDelete*
R: I believe in religious equality.
L: Me too, but it depends what you mean by it.
R: Well let’s pretend I’m a traditionalist Roman Catholic and you’re a Muslim…
L: Umm…
R: …let’s pretend we live somewhere that says religious worship requires the Tridentine Mass.
L: Fine.
R: I think religious freedom means that people like you should be allowed to worship God, just as people like me are.
L: But we already can.
R: No you can’t. Not here and now. Remember what we're pretending.
L: I do. If I want to worship God, I just go to a traditional Roman Catholic Mass and follow the liturgy.
R: Wait, that is not what I mean. You can’t worship God in the way you believe—in a mosque, saying prayers facing Mecca.
L: So? Neither can you or Ratzinger.
R: But that’s different. We don’t want to worship that way. We want to do the Tridentine Mass.
L: So?
Kyle, I agree with you here. The parallel is clear. There is a distinct problem with saying you have the equal opportunity to worship so long as it only occurs as the Tridentine Mass (your hypothetical), since any other form of worship would be like Professional Wrestling, not real worship.
DeleteBut I think you and I see equality of opportunity as more akin to individual liberty, than perhaps Lefty does. His appeal to history and original intent with regard to social institutions is far more conservative. Even on the matter of religious liberty in the US context, an argument can be made that the original intent was not to permit all and sundry forms of worship, including heretical forms. Much of the early constitutional debates on the matter were fairly framed within the Christian context. Originalists with regard to religious liberty would likely argue, yes, Lefty would be correct to claim that everyone has the equal opportunity to worship so long as they worship as Christians.
This comment has been removed by the author.
DeleteKyle,
ReplyDeleteSince you’ve posted two responses comparing marriage equality (debates) to religious liberty (debates), let me share two cents in reply.
I think there is a spectrum of better and worse arguments of the following rough form: it is not strictly necessary to give an activity the typical benefits of some practice, since the activity is not really an instance of the practice to begin with. (This still leaves open for discussion whether the activity deserves some or all such benefits for other reasons.)
I think arguments about marriage (or marriage equality) and religion (or religious liberty) can be made all through this better-and-worse spectrum. Four examples:
A better argument about marriage: it is not strictly necessary to give a one-week companionship contract the typical benefits of marriage equality, since it is not really an instance of marriage to begin with. (Like Pretty Woman.)
A worse argument about marriage: it is not strictly necessary to give a biracial romance that aspires to blossom into “marriage” the typical benefits of marriage equality, since it is not really an instance of marriage to begin with. (Like West Side Story.)
A better argument about religion: it is not strictly necessary to give ritualized human execution the typical benefits of religious liberty, since it is not really an instance of religion to begin with. (Like No Country for Old Men.)
A worse argument about religion: it is not strictly necessary to give ritual human sacrifice the typical benefits of religious liberty, since it is not really an instance of religion to begin with. (Like Apocalypto.)
Perhaps there is a scale of excellence here that varies for each practice. Perhaps ‘best’ and ‘worst’ are ideal extremes of 1 and 0, and perhaps even our strongest arguments, like our strongest batting averages, rarely eclipse .400.
I am not familiar with the argument you reference from Singer. But it seems to me that attempts to restrict someone’s exercise of her religious beliefs do indeed restrict her religious liberty, even when that exercise comes in the killing of an animal for worship or for food, profit, or sport. And it seems to me that the degree of restriction involved (as well as the degree of warrant for the restriction) will be a complex function of things like how important (to the person), how harmful, offensive, and/or immoral the exercise of the religious beliefs is. So perhaps Singer’s argument would land more towards the ‘worse’ than the ‘better’ end of the spectrum, like the Apocalypto argument: for even if we are warranted in restricting the activity, we really are restricting religious liberty.
Likewise, on the face of it, it seems to me that your parody of Lefty (with the Tridentine Mass) would land towards the ‘worse’ than the ‘better’ end of the spectrum.
But whether Lefty’s argument itself lands towards the ‘worse’ or the ‘better’ end of the spectrum—well, that’s precisely what this (part of the) debate is about. Pointing to religious liberty arguments on the ‘worse’ end of the spectrum does not resolve it. The rough form of Lefty’s argument is perfectly legitimate. The argument examples from Pretty Woman and No Country for Old Men illustrate this.
Here’s another ‘better’ argument about religion (without the distraction of killing humans or animals): it is not strictly necessary to give every new self-styled “religion” the typical benefits of religious liberty, since it is not really an instance of religion to begin with. (Like Yeezianity. Just Google “new religions 2014” and see the top hit…)
This is the sort of thinking that academic curriculum review committees have to do all the time—deciding what is and is not really “religion” (or “philosophy” or “science” or whatever). There are better and worse forms of such thinking, there as here.
Right, my view is that the rough form of Lefty's argument isn't legitimate. Specifically, I don't think the move from "X doesn't manifest the inherent properties of institution or concept Y" to "we're justified in coercively interfering with X" is legitimate. So, whether we're justified in interfering with X is distinct, in my mind, from whether or not it really counts as an instance of Y.
ReplyDeleteKyle, I agree with your second and third sentences here. But I do not think they affect the rough form of Lefty's argument.
DeleteBeing justified in coercively interfering with someone is one thing. Being justified in not giving someone benefits is (arguably) another thing. (I realize now that I blurred these two a bit in my transition from Apocalypto to Singer immediately above.)
But the rough form of Lefty's argument, as I represented it immediately above, deals with not giving someone benefits:
"it is not strictly necessary to give an activity the typical benefits of some practice, since the activity is not really an instance of the practice to begin with. (This still leaves open for discussion whether the activity deserves some or all such benefits for other reasons.)"
That strikes me as a much softer, and much more legitimate form of argument, than the one you mention:
"X doesn't manifest the inherent properties of institution or concept Y; therefore we're justified in coercively interfering with X."