tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post535453562849807356..comments2023-08-29T00:45:54.243-07:00Comments on - the dance of reason: Knowing without caring: unmotivated psychopaths Sac State Philosophyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17963066908030437925noreply@blogger.comBlogger13125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-6536200741767028822014-02-24T10:05:50.774-08:002014-02-24T10:05:50.774-08:00Lily, I realize I'm a bit late to the party, b...Lily, I realize I'm a bit late to the party, but I wonder whether you (or the others so far) would consider what evidence might be gleaned from the first-person testimony of those who have experienced damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex. Assuming, of course, that there is such evidence. Or that what those with VMFC damage actually say about themselves could count as "evidence." For example (completely speculating here), would it matter if some percent of those with VMFC damage said something like this: "yes, you know, before my injury I knew and cared; after the injury, I neither knew nor cared." Or this: "before I knew and cared; afterwards I knew but didn't care." Or this: "you know, I've been parroting other people without knowing what the heck morality was about this whole time, before and after the injury." In short, instead of just making the best conjectures that we can about those with such injuries, from our outside, third-person standpoint, I wonder if there is something learn by listening to their first-person standpoint on the matter in question. Do they have one? Is it consistent within a given person? Is it consistent across persons? (Have those with damaged VMFC's ever been asked to "weigh in" on this debate about what they are thinking?)Russell DiSilvestrohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15518807888567382422noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-993969216445879582014-02-23T23:10:36.634-08:002014-02-23T23:10:36.634-08:00My brother. Though I bet Kyle would disagree. Your...My brother. Though I bet Kyle would disagree. Your friend never responds from a sense humor and our psychopath never responds from a sense of right and wrong. So, I might offer the friendly amendment that your friend is a certain kind of hero, too. He badly wants to participate in this mysterious and wonderful practice of bringing smiles to people's face by uttering certain kinds of absurdities and he commits considerable effort and intellectual resources to learning to do so. My (our?) view is that they can succeed at being funny/moral, despite lacking the corresponding sensitivity.G. Randolph Mayeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18285281186698499962noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-58111333357550438212014-02-23T20:50:51.733-08:002014-02-23T20:50:51.733-08:00Hi Lily,
I once knew a person who, I suspected, wh...Hi Lily,<br />I once knew a person who, I suspected, wholly lacked a sense of humor. <br />Is this lack similar to the sociopath's? <br />Since he is also one of the smartest people I've ever known, and knew that no sense of humor is seen as a social failing, he developed a complex algorithm for responding appropriately to things that other people find funny.<br />It was kind of eerie to watch.<br /><br />I would argue that this analogy does not hold.<br />A sociopath with a similar 'moral algorithm' would be acting morally as much as the rest of us are. There would be nothing lacking in his moral actions. (His moral sentiments would be another matter.)<br />In contrast here will always be something lacking in my acquaintance's humor-related actions. He will never be responding out of humor.<br />So I find myself with Randy on this one: The Sociopath Who Gives Himself the Moral Law would be pretty heroic.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09680026462737123023noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-31303455755557980932014-02-23T17:29:46.002-08:002014-02-23T17:29:46.002-08:00I understand the view to be that you haven't m...I understand the view to be that you haven't made a moral judgment if it isn't accompanied by the appropriate moral emotions. If you do so judge, then your subsequent moral behavior (if it occurs) will be partially explained by these emotions. An alternative view is that it is possible to make a moral judgment which is not accompanied by such feelings. In that case, to behave morally, you will need to access some other part of your cognitive/emotional architecture to motivate compliant action. It sounds like you want to say that if you do that, lucky for us, but its not moral behavior and therefore not morally heroic. I want to say that, if you do that, I applaud the effort you make to be a good person. It's heroic because its much harder work and requires much greater commitment than when you are fortunate enough to be hard-wired to act in this way. I do find your view persuasive. I'm just wondering if it is slightly Procrustean.G. Randolph Mayeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18285281186698499962noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-54793037829631086812014-02-23T15:06:30.005-08:002014-02-23T15:06:30.005-08:00Since psychopaths don't internalize rules, I w...Since psychopaths don't internalize rules, I was thinking that these psychopaths would be acting in accordance with our rules based on their evaluation of their non-tuistic interests. We should be really happy when they do that, but it doesn't strike me as morally heroic.Kyle Swanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18426609799325457256noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-13068125938805779082014-02-23T09:22:11.671-08:002014-02-23T09:22:11.671-08:00You really don't think we should admire psycho...You really don't think we should admire psychopaths who figure out how to live within moral guidelines despite lacking the standard issue equipment for doing it? I understand the perspective, but there is still part of me that wants to regard them as morally heroic. Maybe there is a way to be more accommodating to this within your basic framework? G. Randolph Mayeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18285281186698499962noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-50378422891070358432014-02-23T08:41:25.042-08:002014-02-23T08:41:25.042-08:00For the psychopath? I don't reckon admiration ...For the psychopath? I don't reckon admiration is apt. I've seen estimates that psychopaths make up 1% of the population (and 10% of CEOs). The overwhelming majority of them aren't violent criminals, so what you describe isn't too far from the actual world! Kyle Swanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18426609799325457256noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-39422546122811778032014-02-22T20:29:01.182-08:002014-02-22T20:29:01.182-08:00Kyle suppose philosophers finally agree on a moral...Kyle suppose philosophers finally agree on a moral calculus and everyone learns and accepts it. Psychopaths who are taught it and live by it will nevertheless have no grasp of morality and, far from living morally exemplary lives, will not be living morally at all. This, despite the fact it so much more difficult for them, given that they get no help from moral emotions. I like it! But I would like to admire the psychopath who lives in accord with moral rules, as so many do. How should I express my admiration?G. Randolph Mayeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18285281186698499962noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-45692214484936011322014-02-22T14:37:18.856-08:002014-02-22T14:37:18.856-08:00Yeah, I'm pretty puzzled by the combination of...Yeah, I'm pretty puzzled by the combination of judgments that we're morally obligated not to over-serve guests alcohol, but the social awkwardness *alone* of enforcing it should be weightier in our deliberations about what to do. (Additionally, maybe it's not the best example for her -- paternalism is at least morally dubious.) Yet I'm in equal measure comforted by the fact that Foot later seemed to come off her earlier view.<br /><br />It'll be fun to talk more about this Monday.Kyle Swanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18426609799325457256noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-61405556415496350382014-02-22T13:00:37.844-08:002014-02-22T13:00:37.844-08:00Thanks for your comments Kyle! I am fascinated by ...Thanks for your comments Kyle! I am fascinated by the moral/conventional distinction and how it relates the authority of morality. It seems to me that someone who is not able to make the moral conventional distinction may still possess moral concepts, unless we have independent reason to think that that ability is a necessary condition for possessing the concept or being able to make the judgment. What do you make of Philippa Foot who denies that morality has this kind of categorical force? I don't think we would want to say she lacks moral concepts. She even points out that we often let rules of convention like etiquette take precedence over moral rules. I think her example is that we are morally obligated not to over-serve guests alcohol at a dinner party at our house, but that etiquette in that case usually has priority and so we do not prevent our guests from drinking too much. I think I will post more in response to your point about emotions and reasons a little later. Thanks!<br /><br />-Lily Frank<br />Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-71693526000181378312014-02-22T12:50:30.218-08:002014-02-22T12:50:30.218-08:00Thanks very much for your comments Randy. With res...Thanks very much for your comments Randy. With respect to (1)I agree with you that "know but don't care" and "know but don't care very much" are compatible. I am not sure whether or not psychopathy comes in degrees, but one can score higher or lower on various diagnostic measures of psychopathy. I think that there is a huge amount of variability in the extent to which non-psychopathic people are motivated by their moral judgments, depending on their individual psychology, the circumstances, etc., ranging from don't care at all, to care a little, to care a lot, and everything in between. If I want to use the psychopath as an example as a real life amoralist to argue against the internalists view on motivation (which insists that something doesn't count as a moral judgment unless is has an accompanying motivation) then I want to suggest that it is possible that the psychopath isn't motivate at all by his moral judgment, at least some of the time. <br /><br />I really like your second point. It isn't clear why piggy backing on someone else's moral judgments makes them less legitimate as moral judgments at all. <br /><br />-LilyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-78529409301169926482014-02-22T10:52:14.768-08:002014-02-22T10:52:14.768-08:00Thanks, Lily. This is nice. What do you make of th...Thanks, Lily. This is nice. What do you make of the following? I’m attracted to a view of moral concepts, like “wrong”, according to which “Stealing is wrong” means “People shouldn’t steal” and “Don’t steal” and “People have very strong, darn-near inescapable reasons to avoid stealing”. Moral rules are (or, even if they are) a kind of social convention, but they’re also distinguished from merely conventional rules like etiquette or household rules in terms of the strength and authority of the practical reasons and the appropriateness of emotions like guilt, anger and resentment. Indeed, it seems like it’s the linking of these emotions to certain actions that explains the distinctive strength of moral reasons for action (see Rozin 1999).<br /><br />Psychopaths (and Gage after his injury?) don’t take any judgments to have this special kind of authority. They can tell when a rule has currency but they don’t understand it as distinctively moral, viz. binding or overriding. Four-year-olds are like this, too (see Nunner-Winkler and Sodian 1988). They’re happy (and don’t feel guilty at all) about getting what they want, even if they *know* the way they got it violated one of those “moral” rules. This suggests that they don’t grasp the concept. They don’t *care* about having done “wrong”.Kyle Swanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18426609799325457256noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2492055523235356445.post-11284907155968473902014-02-22T00:02:09.048-08:002014-02-22T00:02:09.048-08:00Hi Lily, thanks very much for this. I just have a ...Hi Lily, thanks very much for this. I just have a couple relatively trivial comments. <br /><br />(1) It seems to me that the "know but don't care" and "know but don't care very much" theses are compatible, and it all depends on whether psychopathy is something that admits of degrees. I don't know the answer to this, but sometimes I think philosophers are slightly psychopathic who insist that our moral emotions are not any sort of evidence of the morality of our actions.<br /><br />(2) I'm reluctant to say that psychopaths aren't making moral judgments if they are relying on the views of others. I don't think I am very psychopathic and I am often willing to argue, e.g., The majority of my friends think what I am doing is wrong, so its probably wrong. That's a moral judgment based on the understanding that my moral emotions and reasonings are fallible. So psychopaths may be making real moral judgments on the basis of this sort of evidence and for those very reasons. It's true that in those cases I, like the psychopath, don't really feel that what I'm doing is wrong. But this can be a sign of moral maturity, right? Being able to grasp that what you are doing is wrong even though you don't feel it is.<br />G. Randolph Mayeshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18285281186698499962noreply@blogger.com